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TOURO LAW REVIEW
People v. Webb 1378
(decided October 15, 1991)
A criminal defendant was convicted, by a jury, of multiple sex
crimes. At defendant's trial, jurors were permitted to go home
overnight during deliberations. The defendant claimed that it was
error for the trial court to allow him to waive the mandatory se-
questration requirement of Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) sec-
tion 310.10.1379 The court of appeals held that the statutory
sequestration requirement does not create a fundamental right so
integral to the trial proceeding that it can never be waived by the
defendant. 1380 Although the defendant did not explicitly assert
any violation of his constitutional rights, this decision
nevertheless impacts the right to a jury trial guaranteed by article
I, section 2 of the New York State Constitution. The court of
appeals reasoned that the mandatory sequestration requirement is
merely a creature of statute that does not involve either
constitutionally based or common law rights. 1381
After the jury was charged and retired to deliberate, the court,
the defendant and defense counsel discussed in open court the
possibility of allowing the jurors to go home for the night if they
did not reach a verdict by 4:50 P.M. 1382 After consulting with
his attorney, the defendant agreed to let the jury go home
1378. 78 N.Y.2d 335, 581 N.E.2d 509, 575 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1991).
1379. Id. at 339, 581 N.E.2d at 510, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 657. Section 310.10
of the New York Criminal Procedure Law states:
Following the court's charges, the jury must retire to deliberate upon its
verdict in a place outside the courtroom. It must be provided with
suitable accommodations therefore and must be continuously kept
together under the supervision of a court officer or court officers. In the
event such court officer or court officers are not available, the jury shall
be under the supervision of an appropriate public servant or public
servants. Except when so authorized by the court or when performing
administrative duties with respect to the jurors, such court officers or
public servants, as the case may be, may not speak to or communicate
with them or permit any other person to do so.
N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 310.10 (McKinney 1982).
1380. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d at 336, 581 N.E.2d at 509, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
1381. Id. at 339-40, 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
1382. Id. at 337, 581 N.E.2d at 509, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
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overnight and expressly agreed, on the record, to waive CPL
section 310.10.1383 The following day, the jury convicted the
defendant.
On appeal to the appellate division, fourth department, the
defendant claimed that it was error to permit the jurors to go
home overnight during deliberations. The appellate division
reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. 13 84 The
prosecution was then granted leave to appeal.
The court of appeals reversed the appellate division and re-
instated the guilty verdict. 1385 The court of appeals noted that in
People v. Coons,1386 the case upon which the defendant had
relied in his appeal to the fourth department, the issue of the
waiveability of the statutory sequestration requirement had not
been decided. 1387 According to the court of appeals, in Webb,
1383. Id. at 337, 581 N.E.2d at 510, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 656-57.
1384. Id. at 338, 581 N.E.2d at 510, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
1385. Id.
1386.75 N.Y.2d 796, 551 N.E.2d 587, 552 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1990).
1387. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d at 338, 581 N.E.2d at 510, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
Some appellate di ,ision courts interpreted Coons to suggest that the mandatory
sequestration requirement of CPL § 310.10 could not be waived. In People v.
D'Alvia, 171 A.D.2d 96, 105, 575 N.Y.S.2d 495, 501 (2d Dep't), appeal
denied, 78 N.Y.2d 1075, 583 N.E.2d 950, 577 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1991), the
appellate court included a discussion of this broader reading of Coons.
D'Alvia, however, decided two weeks prior to the court of appeals' decision in
Webb, was similar to that decision. The D'Alvia court held that CPL § 310.10
could be waived by a criminal defendant. The court found that sequestration
was not a guaranteed right protected by the right to a jury trial in criminal
cases under either the New York State or Federal Constitution. Id. at 105-06,
575 N.Y.S.2d at 501-02. D'Alvia discussed a 1976 third department decision
which held that CPL § 310.10 could be waived by a criminal defendant if the
defendant was not prejudiced. Id. at 105, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 501 (citing People
v. Silvernail, 55 A.D.2d 72, 75, 389 N.Y.S.2d 641, 643 (3d Dep't 1976)).
However, after Coons "the Third Department implicitly found that Silvernail
was no longer viable precedent based on its interpretation of Coons as holding
that a violation of CPL § 310.10 could not be waived." Id. (citations omitted).
Two other fourth department cases, decided the same day as People v.WVebb,
161 A.D.2d 1167 (4th Dep't 1990), rev'd, 78 N.Y.2d 335, 581 N.E.2d 509,
575 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1991), also relied on this interpretation of Coons. See
People v. Smith, 161 A.D.2d 1160, 556 N.Y.S.2d 420 (4th Dep't), appeal
denied, 76 N.Y.2d 865, 561 N.E.2d 905, 560 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1990); People
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the decision in Coons merely held that the court's failure to
comply with CPL section 310.10, by allowing jurors to return
overnight during deliberations, could be reviewed on appeal
although the defendant did not object at trial. 1388 The court of
appeals did agree that here, as in Coons, the defendant's failure
to object at trial to the court's non-compliance with the
sequestration requirement of CPL section 310.10 did not preclude
appellate review. 1389
In Webb, the court of appeals rejected the defendant's argument
in regard to the relationship between preservation and waiver.
The defendant argued that because the sequestration requirement
of CPL section 310.10 had "been held to be sufficiently linked to
the mode of proceedings so as not to require preservation,' 1390
this also meant that the requirement could not be waived. 1391
According to the court of appeals, relying on People v.
Ahmed, 1392 the concepts of preservation and waiver are two dis-
tinct concepts, although they are "often 'inextricably inter-
twined.' 1393 In discussing Ahmed, the Webb court stated that
the presence and active participation of the judge was "an
integral component of the common-law right to trial by jury, a
fundamental right which could not be waived by the defendant
except in compliance with the strict statutory terms ... mandated
by the State Constitution ....,,1394
v. Dasher, 161 A.D.2d 1207, 556 N.Y.S.2d 422 (4th Dep't), appeal denied,
76 N.Y.2d 855, 561 N.E.2d 894, 560 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1990). D'Alvia
expressly rejected the third department's interpretation of Coons. D'Alvia, 171
A.D.2d at 105, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 501. The court of appeals, in Webb, agreed
that Coons should not be broadly construed as deciding the waiver issue, but
did not mention these prior cases.
1388. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d at 338, 581 N.E.2d at 510, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
1389. Id.
1390. Id. at 339, 581 N.E.2d at 510, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
1391. Id.
1392. 66 N.Y.2d 307, 487 N.E.2d 894, 496 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1985).
1393. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d at 339, 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658
(quoting Ahmed, 66 N.Y.2d at 311, 487 N.E.2d at 896, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 986;
People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1, 5 n.1, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 1135 n.1, 420
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The court distinguished Webb from Ahmed, stating that Ahmed
implicated a "defendant's common-law and constitutionally based
right to a jury trial., 1395 In Webb, however, the court noted that
jury sequestration is completely a creature of statute, and does
not "reflect [an] established common-law right of the
defendant."' 1396 According to the court, CPL section 310.10
"does not relate to the actual trial proceeding." 1397 In Webb, the
court took the view that when, as here, the particular
circumstances do not suggest a need for jury sequestration during
deliberations, it is within the court's discretion.
139 8
The Webb court stated that this less than stringent view of
mandatory jury sequestration is in accord with the federal
view. 1399 The court referred to United States v. Arciniega1 40 0
and United States v. Acuff.140 1 These cases reflect the majority
view in federal courts that jury sequestration, after submission of
the case to the jury, is within the sound discretion of the judge,
and that absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant, lack of
sequestration is not reversible error. 1402 Unlike New York, in
1395. Id.
1396. Id. at 339-40, 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658. In Webb, the
court found that jury sequestration does not implicate any common-law rights
implicitly stating that jury sequestration is not part of the constitutional right to
a jury trial in criminal cases under article 1, section 2 of the New York State
Constitution. In Ahmed, the court explained that article 1, section 2 has been
interpreted as guaranteeing the right to trial by jury as it existed at common-
law. Ahmed, 66 N.Y.2d at 311, 487 N.E.2d at 896, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 986. In
addition, the court in Webb indicated that at common law, sequestration was
not for the purpose of protecting the defendant's rights but to force the jury to
make a decision. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d at 340, 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d
at 658.
1397. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d at 340, 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
1398. Id. at 339-40, 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58. Provided,
however, that the criminal defendant has properly waived his right. Id.
1399. Id. at 340, 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
1400. 574 F.2d 931 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 908 (1978).
1401. 410 F.2d 463 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 830 (1969).
1402. Id. at 466-67; Arciniega, 574 F.2d at 933. In federal court, the judge
has the discretion during the trial and deliberations to sequester the jury. In
New York, the Criminal Procedure Law gives the judge such discretion "from
the time the jurors are sworn to the time they retire to deliberate upon the
verdict ..... N.Y. CIM. PROc. LAW § 270.45 (McKinney 1982).
1992] 1067
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [2020], Art. 62
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss3/62
TOURO LAW REVIEW
federal courts, jury sequestration has no statutory predicate
requiring sequestration during jury deliberations. Therefore, the
trial judge may decline to sequester the jury without the
defendant's consent. 1403 As in New York, it appears that there is
no right to sequester the jury that is constitutionally guaranteed
under the Federal Constitution. 1404 Under New York law, based
on Webb, the defendant is given more protection than under
federal law because a proper waiver of CPL section 310.10 is
required before sequestration is denied.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FOURTH DEPARTMENT
In re DES Market Share Litigation1405
(decided November 15, 1991)
The plaintiffs, children who sustained injuries caused by their
mothers' ingestion during pregnancy of the drug diethylstilbestrol
(DES), claimed that an order denying a trial by jury on the issue
of "market share" 1406 violated their right to a jury trial pursuant
to the New York State Constitution. 140 7 The court held that
because this was an action for money damages for personal
injuries that raised an "issue of fact" and was a request for
"legal relief," 1408 the New York State Constitution 1409 required
a jury trial. 1
4 10
1403. See Powell v. Spalding, 679 F.2d 163, 166 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982).
1404. Id. (citing Young v. Alabama, 443 F.2d 854, 856 (Sth Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 976 (1972)).
1405. 171 A.D.2d 352, 578 N.Y.S.2d 63 (4th Dep't 1991), aff'd, No. 87,
1992 WL 60498 (N.Y. Apr. 1, 1992).
1406. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 511-12, 539
N.E.2d 1069, 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 950, cert. denied, Rexall Drug Co. v.
Tigue, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
1407. DES, 171 A.D.2d at 354, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 64; N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 2.
1408. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4101(1) (McKinney 1963).
1409. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
1410. DES, 171 A.D.2d at 356, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
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